Public sentiment regarding the Israel-Lebanon conflict is largely negative and polarized, marked by deep anger towards Israel's military actions, a strong desire for peace, and criticism of the collateral damage to innocent civilians. Many comments express frustration over historical grievances and call for accountability while simultaneously highlighting the complexities of the situation.

Israel

Hezbollah

International Community

Israel had no declared objectives in 2006, so it could not fail to achieve them... Israel was dragged into fighting in 2006 in response to a Hezbollah attack without truly knowing what it wanted to accomplish.

From the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 until 2006, Israel did not view Hezbollah as a primary enemy. The most dangerous enemy, as perceived by Israel, was the Syrian army, and the most urgent threat was Palestinian terrorism of the Second Intifada. As a result, the IDF did not train or prepare for combat against Hezbollah in any way. The IDF command had no plans for such a conflict, Israeli intelligence did not focus on Hezbollah as a primary enemy, and the political echelon in Israel had no goals or aspirations regarding Lebanon.

The war in 2006 was fought by an army trained for conventional warfare against a regular army, that in practice, had experience mainly in counter-terrorism operations against low level plastinian terrorist. The Second Intifada required the IDF to deploy immense forces, and as a result, the IDF’s reserve system barely trained in the years leading up to 2006. Even when training occurred, it was for combat against a conventional regular army, not a guerrilla force like Hezbollah.

The combination of an army untrained and unequipped for this type of warfare, coupled with the absence of clear objectives, led to the relative failure in 2006.

However, I would caution against labeling this war as an Israeli defeat, as Hezbollah suffered a severe blow during the conflict. Its decision not to engage in intense fighting with Israel in October 2023 and instead choose a limited conflict is directly linked to the blow it received in 2006 from an IDF that even they acknowledge was significantly weaker than the IDF of 2023.

**Now to 2024:**

After the 2006 war and the realization that Hezbollah was a more dangerous enemy than Israel had previously assessed, and that the IDF was unprepared for combat against such an organization, Israel began to shift its focus to preparing for a confrontation with Hezbollah. The collapse of the Syrian regime’s military capability at the start of the civil war also allowed the IDF to concentrate its efforts on Hezbollah. The IDF began training for the type of warfare required in a conflict with Hezbollah, intelligence efforts prioritized Hezbollah as a primary enemy, and the political echelon viewed another war with Hezbollah as a matter of time and prepared accordingly.

*In summary:*
In 2006, Hezbollah faced a severely limited IDF capability with many contributing factors: Hezbollah was not seen as a primary enemy, so the IDF was not trained to fight it; intelligence did not focus on it; the reserve system was barely trained; and the political echelon failed to define clear objectives for the IDF in the war.

In 2024, Hezbollah faced the full strength of the IDF and the State of Israel. That, in essence, is the difference.

Far_Appeal9293

20 years of dedicated infiltration and intel collecting? Israeli got totally surprised by Hamas and could do much against houthis missile attacks yet scored huge successes again itsn and huzbollah. Reason is simple: these are known enemies and had spent huge sum and most of the resource on them.doesnt help that  Iran and huzbolah got arrogant and cocky since their successes earlier against Israel and their successes in intervening in Syria civil war. Its classic examples of success of last war getting drunk in past successes while relative failures of last wars licked their wounds and basically figured its enemies out

Ok-Stomach-

Hopefully someone with more specific knowledge than I chimes in but it has a lot to do with Hezbollah being an extremely sophisticated and well armed, well trained group. They aren't the "sandals and AKs" insurgents of Iraq or Afghanistan; they have high quality training and support from Iran and even Russia (Hezbollah sent forces to be trained by Russians in Syria and get combat experience in that war).

At Wadi Saluki, Hezbollah was well equipped with Sagger and Kornet ATGMs in defensive positions. It was really good defensive terrain being a valley surrounded by high ground that Hezbollah was dug into.

The plan called for Israeli infantry to clear the high ground of threats so armor could move into the valley. They were to have artillery support. What happened was that Israeli infantry was ineffective at clearing the high ground and artillery was hesitant to fire on the enemy because of the risk of friendly fire. The infantry, armor and artillery all lost cohesion with the infantry unable to support the tanks, the tanks not knowing where the infantry was and taking heavy ATGM fire, and the artillery unwilling to fire without knowing the positions of friendly forces.

Hezbollah was well dug in and fanatical in their willingness to fight, and also well equipped and trained. As sophisticated as Hamas has proven themselves to be Hezbollah is so much more sophisticated that in at least one engagement in 2006 IDF thought they'd gotten into a friendly fire exchange with Israeli special forces. 

Hezbollah had also dug tunnels throughout the operational area that enabled them to evade initial sweeps and then reoccupy positions thought cleared.

The response from Israel post-war was to improve interoperability between arms and invest in active protection systems for armor. Their most recent conflict was heavily informed by the 2006 experience with Israel preferring an indirect opening move with the pager affair and specifically targeting Hezbollah missile and rocket caches before they could be employed.

proquo

There is a roughly 80 page report on the Israeli failure that the Americans published at Leavenworth. It’s kind of the only source I have on the issue but here’s a few points worth considering:
1. Politics: Israeli air strikes against Lebanese civilians received global condemnation and pressure.
2. Air power: the IDF thought air power would be more decisive than it was (which we have seen before).
3. Command: ground operations were led by an IAF officer iirc and his orders were a goobledigook of corporate newspeak that lower commands literally did not understand.
4. Hostages: IDF troops captured by Hezbollah limited offensive options and intensity in Lebanon (whereas in 2024 the IDF was able to go all in against Hezbollah). Finally,
5. Poor training: IDF forces were basically occupation troops lacking in field craft and tactical training. They were not able to adapt to complex Hezbollah fortifications and tactics.

In sum, Israel ineffectively bashed against Lebanon and incurred heavy losses for no gains and lots of political losses. However, it does seem obvious that IDF learned from this defeat. If memory is right they lost less men in their border fights and invasion of Lebanon going back to October 8 2023 than they lost in a month in the summer of 2006, while mortally wounding Hezbollah.

Damo_Banks

I don't know if I'd go as far as to consider it a 'failure', as that is a matter dependent upon the political objectives of the conflict, but there are no doubts that things did not go as well as planned and that there were individual failings within the campaign. One big issue was that the Israelis went into the fight underestimating Hesbullah (which itself had changed doctrine since the previous notable conflict in 2000). However, once the Israelis figured out that they were actually a pretty reasonably equipped and motivated force, they became far more circumspect. The last couple of days of the conflict were far more successful for Israel than the initial punch in the face they received in the early days. In fairness, not the first time Israel adapted on the fly.

u/Damo_Banks  proposes five points, all of which are reasonably fair though I would tweak a couple of them.The Leavenworth document he refers to is probably this one. [https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/we-were-caught-unprepared.pdf](https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/we-were-caught-unprepared.pdf)

With respect to item 3, this document is fairly excoriating. [https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA515328.pdf](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA515328.pdf)

*"SOD (systemic operational design) theory was greatly influenced by the writings of the French postmodern philosophers, specifically Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Felix Guattari (1930–1992) and, to a lesser extent, Jean-Francois Lyotard (1924–1998), Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007), and Paul Virilio (b. 1932). \[...\] After several alterations and revisions, the new IDF doctrine was endorsed by Air Force lieutenant general and chief of the defense staff Dan Halutz in April 2006. Reportedly, even General Halutz did not understand the new doctrine that he signed.* 

*\[...\]*

*During the Lebanon conflict in July 2006, the major problem the IDF had with SOD was the new terminology and methodology. It was questionable whether the majority of IDF officers could grasp a design that Naveh proclaimed was “not easy to understand . . . because \[it is\] not intended for ordinary mortals.” Many officers found the entire SOD concept elitist. Other officers could not understand why the old system of simple orders and terminology was replaced by one that few could understand. For example, new terms such as strategic directive, strategic purpose, system boundary, operational boundaries, campaign organizing theme, and rival system rationale were overused in place of traditional military terms. Units were ordered to “render the enemy incoherent,” make the enemy feel “distress” or “chased down,” or “achieve standoff domination of the theatre.” The new vocabulary was heavily drawn from French postmodern philosophy, literary theory, architecture, and psychology. Because of its cryptic character, it is hardly surprising that not every officer in the IDF had the time or inclination to study this philosophy"*

This SOD, which comes under "Effects based operations" is what led to the doctrine which emphasised air attacks, which of course weren't as successful as proponents had advertised as per Damo's Item 2.

The_Chieftain_WG

Rubbama

As of this moment it seems lebanon will stay on the sidelines inshallah.

ThatWeirdMuslimGuy

Hopefully no, and doesn't seem like it.

Hezb don't have any weapons or power to participate and even said they don't want to. Only thing that would screw us over is if Iran secretly sends external groups to launch rockets from our land, hopefully that doesn't happen.

m0h97

No? Why would we be dragged? Just because hezeb is backed and helped by iran, does not mean they have to do everything iran does lol

yellowspeeed

Even if we didn't interfere directly, which i doubt we will, there will be many repercussions that will fall upon our heads. Starting with the aviation and the summer season. Lots of airlines started canceling their flights, with some reaching end of june. What will happen is we will sit tight, see our neighbors play cat and mouse, and we will eat sh*t

AdDecent4234

Definetly. It doesnt seem that iran will surrender on the negotiation table so US will end up joining the war. When that happens it means the decision was taken to take down the iranian regime and hezb will throw evrything they have left to try and save it

Crypto3arz

So far Hezeb el esteslem is following the government orders to not interfere. 

Hopefully this remains the same and if their daddy gives them orders to do anything they won’t because they can’t really do shit, they are extremely weak and will only bring destruction for no reason again.

Even then Iran is weak as hell they are taking a never stopping beating, and is barely able to respond and anything they respond 99% is getting intercepted.
I am still waiting for the 7mins, and constant bulshit they have been spreading and promising for decades.

Bilbo_swagggins

My main worry is that Lebanon will see accidental ballistic missiles landing from Iran. Some of those missiles rely on GPS for their targeting.  
Now who is into GPS jamming into the region and having Uber, Google Maps and the likes glitching and having Tel Aviv Tinder profiles geolocated to Baalbek? Yeah, that is a major concern!!  
But The Lords of Captagon are too weak to do anything for now. Heck ,the IDF is still doing operations in Syria!. If they are that relaxed, then I don't think Lebanon is at risk. For now. Let us see what day 2 of 14/15 will bring

Brilliant-Lab546

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I think we just want wars to end with Israel and we know the cause and that’s Hezbollah but I’d be shocked if peace because as long as Hezbollah is doing well and still existing I just don’t see it because they still would make any excuse to exist or to still exist they are the biggest obstacle to peace specially when there mind is for a Palestinian cause always and there no more a resistance than I am queen Latifah . But I feel it’s our land we can do what we want if we  feel we would do better with just a fully armed army that can get stronger and drop Hezbollah we can do that that’s gonna take time I’ll see it to believe it  but that’s up to the new government it’s either they want stability or just continuing this tiring cycle and the country continuing to be a failed state in end it’s all up to them

If the price for peace with plenty of Arab states is a Palestinian state than they can go F themselves.

I DO think that a Palestinian state should exist at some point, but only under conditions that defend Israel from any potential harm. Conditions such as: the removal of Hamas, the PA stopping to finance terrorists (for real, not this BS they spread recently), the punishment of terrorists who hurt the other state's citizens (both sides of course for fairness), a long and watched-over de-radicalization process for Palestinians, and giving Israel full legitimacy to take down a hostile ruling force in case one such as this gets elected.

When I hear a Palestinian state is an Israeli interest I can't help but get confused. An Israeli interest is peace with the Arab states, and (apparently) a Palestinian state is the way to get there. However, under the current status-quo, a Palestinian state is anything but an Israeli interest. At best, a Palestinian state will be another Lebanon, and at worst it'll be a Hamas state. If the terms I presented earlier are fulfilled, than a Palestinian state can be negotiated.

Itzko123

we can wish. it was always wild to me why we at war with Lebanon, they should be our natural allies.

Demonidze

The geopolitical changes in the whole Levant are  yet to be fully digested by all of us. The Assad’s regime lasted for 54 years (!). Hezbollah was on a growth trend from 1982, ie 43 years of quasi constant power and influence increase. These two, Assad and HA, were the biggest power brokers in Lebanon for more than half of the country’s age under its modern form (Le Grand Liban 1920). Bottom line: give it time to digest the tsunami that Israel’s war has ignited. The Lebanon to make peace with, is timidly emerging from a very long nightmare.

Unbelievable_OG

Imagine being Lebanon and thinking you have the higher ground and come at us with demands regarding the made up group of people called Palestinians.

Don't need peace or normalization with their asses, just f off our borders and leave us the fuck alone, the more they tie themselves with the palestinians the more it fucks them up, I thought it should be already clear by now.

kulamsharloot

LIVE alternative links.

[https://www.middleeasteye.net/live/israel-rejects-hamas-truce-offer-thousands-forced-flee-gaza-city](https://www.middleeasteye.net/live/israel-rejects-hamas-truce-offer-thousands-forced-flee-gaza-city)

[https://www.trtworld.com/live/682d0cd9272976ac4c84461d](https://www.trtworld.com/live/682d0cd9272976ac4c84461d)

[https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250916-un-inquiry-finds-israels-war-on-gaza-to-be-genocide/](https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250916-un-inquiry-finds-israels-war-on-gaza-to-be-genocide/)

Budget-Song2618

Israel has launched a series of air strikes targeting Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon, drawing condemnation from Lebanon's Prime Minister amid escalating tensions.

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